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
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Dismissing the Islamic Khilafah Discourse in Indonesia According to Yudian Wahyudi in Hasan Hanafi's Perspective of Islamic Fundamentalism

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ABSTRACT

This research is a descriptive analysis of the epistemological basis of Yudian Wahyudi's attitude towards the Islamic caliphate discourse in Indonesia. The caliphate discourse, which according to its proponents is a form of fundamental principles in religion, is contrasted with the Pancasila ideology which is the state philosophy. This research is qualitative and uses a descriptive approach to Yudian Wahyudi's thoughts about the Islamic caliphate in Indonesia from the perspective of Islamic fundamentalism put forward by Hassan Hanafi. The results of the research suggest that the Islamic caliphate discourse that has emerged in several organizations today is a form of taking over political power from legitimate sovereignty. According to Yudian, discourse like this must be rejected because it does not follow maqashid sharia. The end of the Ottoman Caliphate and the Arab community's choice to form their state as the center of Islamic civilization is an argument for the irrelevance of the imperialist pattern of power in modern society. For this reason, the caliphate discourse must be directed at the movement to improve the quality of religious understanding and knowledge competence of the people as caliph fil ardh so that they can internalize Islamic values in all aspects of community life. This perspective is relevant to the thought of Islamic fundamentalism initiated by Hassan Hanafi. orthodoxy discourse, Romanticism of history, or an a priori attitude towards modernity is not a form of Islamic fundamentalism because it will only give rise to acts of anarchism which are prohibited in Islam. Islamic fundamentalism must be interpreted with rational thinking, broad insight, mastering the history of world nations, accepting the challenges of the times, and being open to modern civilizations. So that the face of Islam will remain friendly to all civilizations and shalihun li kulli masa wa makan.

KEY WORDS: caliphate;fundamentalism; Islam,Judian Wahyudi;Hasan Hanafi; Indonesia

Introduction

The history of the caliphate in Islamic history began with the election of Abu Bakr as caliph of Rasulullah (successor of the apostle) then successively elected Umar bin Khattab, Usman bin Affan, and Ali bin Abi Talib in the same position and were called Khulafaurrasyidin. Among Sunnis, only the caliph al-rasyidin who according to them has the capacity as a religious and political leader in leading the Muslim community is called al-Islam din wa daulat (Islam is a religion and a state)(March, 2015). The Islamic caliphate after the al-Rasyidin caliphate was continued by the Umayyad caliphate in Damascus and Spain, the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt, and the Ottoman Caliphate in Istanbul. The caliphate model of government ended after the formation of the national state of the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal(Sudrajat, 2009). Since that time, the institution of the caliphate, which is seen as political supremacy and a symbol of the unity of the Muslim Ummah, has disappeared(Ghafur, 2016).

However, in subsequent developments, Muslims tried to revive the caliphate system through the congress in Cairo in 1926, and the caliphate congress in Mecca. In India, a caliphate movement emerged under the title Pan Islamism(Royyani & Shobaruddin, 2020). In Indonesia, a caliphate committee was formed based in Surabaya(Aziz, 2020; Milani, 2022), and in Lampung, it takes the form of an organization Khilafatul Muslimin which was founded by Abdul Qadir Baraja in 1997 with the highest structure namely the Central Caliphate, Daulah, Ummul Quro to the lowest, Masulan(Asiyah & Hakim, 2022). Due to different supporting reasons, supporters of this movement ended up rejecting the state ideology(Kholid, 2021). The many philosophical, sociological, and political difficulties mean that this discourse is no longer the mainstream of public thought. (Zuhri, 2021)This condition resulted in a decline of this discourse because it is suspected that there has been a reorientation of this discourse from its initial idea of maintaining Islamic sovereignty(Effendy, 2018). At the same time, country-legitimate countries have created strict policies to police the movement of this discourse(Arifianto, 2020).

In Indonesia, the discourse of the Islamic caliphate is contrasted with the ideology of Pancasila as a state principle. (Jaelani, 2015)In its implementation, this discourse is positioned as an attack on state sovereignty and is met with power(Asiyah & Hakim, 2022). However, this was not completely successful because this discourse developed ideologically which was supported by convincing historical academic narratives(Chaqoqo & Ma'mun, 2022). For this reason, a comparable academic epistemological discourse is needed as an antithesis to this discourse.

In the author's research, studies of this discourse in Indonesia focus on identification and classification. Several studies have identified the controversy over the ideology of the caliphate in Indonesia(Azmy, 2020; Bagus et al., 2018; Djidin & Syamsuddin, 2019; Hamdi et al., 2021; Mahamid, 2022). In another section, there is a study that emphasizes the radicalism aspect of social movements which are identified as a manifestation of the discourse of the Islamic caliphate in Indonesia(Cipto & Iskandar, 2022; Mufaizin, 2020; Nur, 2021; Taufani, 2020). The narrative that is built places this discourse as an ongoing thought with various perspectives and tends to be contradictory. Complementing the dynamics of thinking about this discourse, this research emphasizes the analysis of Yudian

Wahyudi's thought in explaining the caliphate epistemologically. Yudian's capacity and capabilities as a professor in the field of jurisprudence and head of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP) which is responsible for maintaining the purity of Pancasila values have an urgency in providing a comprehensive perspective in defining this discourse. To strengthen this analysis, Yudian's thoughts will be compared with the concept of Islamic fundamentalism put forward by Hasan Hanafi.

Hasan Hanafi is a Muslim intellectual who has a very serious interest in Islamic civilization(Putra, 2019). With a unique perspective, Hasan Hanafi emphasized that Islamic fundamentalism is not orthodoxy, historical romanticism, or an a priori view of modernity. Nor is it a movement of extremism or exclusivism(Bashri, 2015; Gufron, 2018). Islamic fundamentalism is a movement with a vision and mission of forming the whole human being so that he can foster unity among the people, maintain their identity, and defend the weak(Hadirois & Ediyono, 2015). Therefore, Islamic fundamentalism is not always oriented toward power but was born as a movement to liberate Muslim countries from colonialism.

Through epistemological, philosophical, and ushul fiqh approaches, this study is expected to provide an intellectual perspective in understanding this discourse. Various public misconceptions that arise due to a lack of information regarding the aims of this discourse have resulted in this movement still existing even though it is weak. Information disseminated by supporters of this discourse through various media requires a socialized counter-narrative so that state sovereignty is maintained.

Get to know the figure of Yudian Wahyudi

Judian Wahyudi was born on April 17, 1960, in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan. Yudian's father, Asmin Prajabangsa, was an army officer from Banyumas, Central Java, who was assigned to Balikpapan in 1948. Mr. Asmin was a santri (Islamic and Nationalist student as well as the Army) who taught Islamic knowledge(Djidin & Syamsuddin, 2019).

Yudian attended elementary school in Pacitan until completing his education at the Pacitan Tremas Islamic Boarding School managed by KH Habib Dimiyati from 1972 to 1978, and Krapyak al-Munawwir Islamic Boarding School from 1978 to 1979(Supriatman, 2017). Yudian obtained a degree and Drs (Dokterandus) degrees from the Sharia Faculty of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, in 1982 and 1987 respectively. He also obtained a BA degree from the Faculty of Philosophy, Gajah Mada University in 1986 and an MA degree from McGill University, Montreal, Canada, in 1993 after writing a thesis on "Hasbi's Theory of Ijtihad in the Context of Indonesian Fiqh(Mansur, 2012). Yudian obtained his Ph.D. with a dissertation "The Slogan of Returning to the Qur'an and Sunnah: Comparison of the Responses of Hasan Hanafi, Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri and Nurcholish Madjid" in 2002 (Wahyudi, 2002). In Western universities, Yudians can access classical and modern literary sources and discuss directly with Muslim reformers, such as Fazlur Rahman and Hasan Hanafi.

Yudian is a productive Muslim thinker in the academic world. He has produced at least 12 book titles, 52 translations in Arabic, English, and French, as well as dozens of scientific articles, most of which were presented in international forums. In the field of jurisprudence(fiqh and ushul fiqh), Yudian received special

recognition from Kersten and David R. Vishanoff. Necdet Subasi even places Yudian on a par with contemporary Islamic thought experts such as Hamid Inayat, Michel Cuypers, and John L. Esposito. Ellen McClaney also compared Yudian to Issa J. Boulatta (Djardin & Syamsuddin, 2019).

Biography of Hasan Hanafi

Hasan Hanafi was born on February 13, 1935, in Cairo, Egypt. He is a descendant of the Berber and Bedouin tribes in Egypt. At the age of five, he learned to recite the Koran from Shaikh Sayyid. He underwent basic education at Madrasah Sulaiman Gawiys, then continued his education at al-Muallimin teacher school. However, when he was in fifth grade, Hassan Hanafi moved to Madrasah al-Silahdar (Azra, 2003).

Hasan Hanafi continued his higher education at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, Egypt, and is known for his extraordinary achievements. One of the papers he wrote on the Theory of Knowledge and Happiness according to al-Ghazali, was rated *summa cum laude*. Hasan Hanafi then received a master's and doctoral degree after graduating from the Sorbonne University in Paris and after that, his ideas developed rapidly. As is known, he wrote a thesis totaling 900 pages entitled *L Exegeses de la phenomenologie: Letat Actual de la Methode Phenomenologie et Son Application a Phenomena Religieux*. Hasan Hanafi's monumental dissertation aims to connect the science of *ushul fiqh* with Edmund Husserl's phenomenological theory. In 1961, this dissertation, welcomed by Egyptian academics, was awarded the best work in that country. This achievement further strengthens Hasan Hanafi's position as a contemporary Islamic intellectual who has had a major influence on the development of Islamic thought (Indiraphasa, 2021).

Hasan Hanafi's work is divided into three periods: the first period took place in the 60s; The Second Period took place in the 70s; and the Third Period lasted from the 80s to the 90s. In the early 60s, Hasan Hanafi's thinking was influenced by the nationalistic-socialistic-populistic ideology that developed in Egypt (Pan-Arabism ideology) and the unfavorable national conditions after Egypt lost the war against Israel in 1967. In the early 1970s, Hasan Hanafi also concentrated on the reasons for the defeat so his writing was more populist, and wrote many articles for various media, such as *Al-Katib*, *Al-Adab*, *Al-Fikr al-Mu'ashir*, and *Mimbar Al-Islam*. This was followed by the publication of his books "*Qadhaya Mu'ashirat fi Fikrina al-Mu'ashir*" (1976) and "*Qadhaya Mu'ashirat fi al Fikr al-Gharib*" (1977). This second book examines the thinking of Western scholars to see how they understand society's problems and make changes. Likewise, his book "*Dirasat Islamiyyah*", written in 1978 and published in 1981, contains descriptions and analyses of updates to classical Islamic sciences, such as *ushul fiqh*, *ushuluddin* sciences, and philosophy.

In the 1980s to early 1990s, with political conditions more stable than the previous year, Hasan Hanafi began writing the book "*Al-Turats wa al-Tajdid*" (1980) which provided a theoretical basis for the concept and process of renewal. After that, he wrote "*Al-Yasar Al-Islami*", which was more like a "political manifesto" of an ideological nature. Furthermore, the book "*Min Al-Aqidah ila Al-Tsaurah*" consists of five volumes that were compiled for almost ten years, and were only published in 1988. Hasan Hanafi discusses the main points of reform that were previously proclaimed in depth in this book so that it is considered his most monumental work. In addition, from 1985 to 1987, Hanafi wrote many articles and presented them at various seminars in the United States, France, the

Netherlands, the Middle East, Japan, and Indonesia. Then a book entitled *Religion, Ideology, and Development* was published in 1993. Several other articles were compiled into the book "*Islam in the Modern World*" (2 volumes) (Alfian, 2019)

Method

This study focuses on the thoughts of Yudian Wahyudi who, using an *ushul fiqh* approach, expressed his rejection of the caliphate in the Indonesian context. As a comparison, the author puts forward thoughts about Hassan Hanafi's Islamic fundamentalism which were discussed in his dissertation and on several occasions by Yudian. Thus, the rejection of the caliphate is based on various epistemic perspectives. This research is qualitative and uses a descriptive approach. Data analysis was carried out according to Huberman and Miles' three stages, namely reduction, display, and verification (Milles & Huberman, 2016). Data is reduced by method categorize them based on research questions. The research data is displayed in narrative form, while the verification procedure is carried out by comparing data from various sources and then using interpretive analysis to determine its relevance.

The Islamic Caliphate from Yudian Wahyudi's point of view

Yudian called the caliphate a government system that was dead and irrelevant and needed to be rebuilt (Nahuddin & Prastyo, 2020). The term caliphate (*caliph*) is not written in the Al-Quran QS Al-Baqarah (2):30–37 only uses the idiom caliph which linguistically means a person who can manage mistakes, errors (*khilaf*), or differences and diversity (*ikhtilaf*) and is ultimately considered a breaker problem (Djardin & Syamsuddin, 2019). In another sense according to Wahyudi, the word mistake can also be used to refer to mistakes and weaknesses because basically, the person who made the mistake is in a weak state. It could also mean negative potential that arises from these differences. Every difference has the potential to cause division, and then weakness (Wahyudi, 2018).

Yudian emphasized that Indonesia does not need a caliphate as a government system, but needs as many caliphs as possible in the sense of professionals who meet qualifications and competence in various fields. However, the condition is that you must master the names (*al-asma'*). Yudian interprets *al-asma'* with knowledge, science, and technology. Apart from that, professionals also have to win matches with the current system. "Not just a sparring war that has the potential to flow blood (*yusfikud-dima'*) as prophesied by the angels" (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023).

Yudian claims that although the term "Islamic state" was not well-known in the past, supporters of the caliphate were motivated by the Prophet Muhammad's achievements. Professionals from diverse areas helped to carry out the first bloodless revolution in history, the Fathul Makkah incident. Sadly, proponents of the caliphate occasionally overlook the fact that the historical records created with the assistance of numerous communities are no longer linear. After multiple challenges, the Ottoman Caliphate finally collapsed on November 1, 1922. Meanwhile, the Arabs founded a kingdom (*mamalakah*) in place of the caliphate (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023).

In support of this concept, Yudian reminded me that none of the founding fathers of Indonesia suggested the caliphate as a separate state because they understood that the form of government was obsolete and did not need to be revived, particularly in this particular situation. Wahyudi went on to emphasize the history of Islam's distinctiveness, which has never been found in any other nation.

Consciously ceding control of their kingdoms, the archipelago's kings swore allegiance to Indonesia, a newly declared nation on August 17, 1945. This runs counter to historical records when prominent Islamic individuals in other regions of the world, such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani, demanded this. Other Islamic monarchs opposed the Ummah's unity under the banner of Pan-Islamism (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023).

Yudian went on to say that the caliphate does not have to be viewed as a political structure in the Indonesian setting. Quite the contrary, to uphold the ideology of the state and accomplish the goals of independence outlined in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, it is necessary to have as many caliphs as possible in a variety of fields. According to Yudian, individuals who become experts in the field of asthama and become victorious in contests are considered professional and qualified caliphs. Al-Asma' (name) is a title used in science, technology, and the workplace. To be appreciative of the gifts bestowed, Indonesia requires caliphs like Prophet Nuh (KH, Bachelor of Marine Technology), Daud (KH, Bachelor of Military Technology), Sulaiman (KH Multi), Isa (KH, Bachelor of Medicine), and others. and a nation at peace, as well as understanding Islam's mission, which is to bring blessings to all people [rahmatan li al-'alamin] (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023).

Islam and Pancasila from Yudian Wahudi's Perspective

Yudian Wayudi stated that Pancasila was God's greatest gift to the Indonesian people in the 20th century (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023). Because of this, it must be preserved by bolstering national unity and national consensus. According to Yudian, it was a distinct and enchanted ideology in the 20th century that managed to bring together several different belief systems at the same time. Also mentioned was the idea that Pancasila was a moderate or middle-class ideology that eventually evolved into the central theme of the Indonesian people (Nahuddin & Prastyo, 2020).

Yudian claims that Islam and Pancasila may coexist at present for two reasons. First of all, Pancasila follows the teachings of Islam, according to which the idea of having confidence in a single, all-powerful god is a manifestation of monotheism, the core belief of Islam. Second, Pancasila is a sentence of sawa' since it has become widely recognized as the consensus (ijma) by all societal sectors, even Muslims who are expected to uphold certain commitments (akad). Islam and Pancasila do not conflict with Yudian philosophy. The "locality" and "objectivity" of Islamic and sharia ideals—which are typically exhibited in Indonesia because of the state's philosophical foundation—are referred to as Pancasila.

Yudian adeptly demonstrates Pancasila's compatibility with the widely accepted notion of maqashid al-syariah in Muslim epistemology, as a scholar possessing a scientific background in ushul fiqh. According to Islam, there are lofty universal principles such as justice, humanity, oneness, divinity, and democracy. Wahyudi claims that Pancasila as a whole represents Islam in the treatise. But they are both autonomous in their existential sense, and Pancasila has operationalized the three Islamic sharia principles. All of the tenets of Pancasila are based on maqashid dharuriyah, and maqashid hajiah is required for a cohesive and democratic form of national life to realize Pancasila. In the context of the Indonesian country, Pancasila—along with its ideas and symbols—is a way to beautify sin. In other words, the locals engage in it to understand maqashid sharia (Wahyudi, 2015).

However, in terms of the use of other terminology related to ushul fiqh, Yudian stated that God's highest law that regulates social and political life is not the holy book but the

Constitution. By constitutionally, Pancasila has been accepted as a consensus or ijma'. This is the nation's highest consensus because this needs to be maintained, and anyone who opposes this consensus will be sanctioned. Yudian even stated that this was against God's will (Wahyudi, 1995). Yudian went on to say that to comply with QS An-Nisa verse 59, Indonesian Muslims must uphold Pancasila and incorporate its principles into national and governmental affairs. This verse's agreement needs to be understood in the context of all human agreements, including political ones. As a result, all Muslims in Indonesia, including the nation's children, have a responsibility to protect the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila and to continuously improve them in light of current events and circumstances. There would be discord and violence if the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila for Muslims were not defended.

The idea of sadd al-dzariah (blocking the road/preventive action) is well-known in ushul fiqh. If a group of individuals declared another type of state in the name of the majority, say a caliphate in one area of Indonesia, you can assume that other areas where the majority population is not Muslim would not wish to follow and are subject to the state's rules. The worst-case scenario is that they will create further states, like the Christian State of Papua, the Hindu State of Bali, and the Christian State of Manado if things continue unchecked. There will be a civil war if that takes place. Therefore, to prevent internal strife among the country's youth, Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia must be upheld. Furthermore, very little of the five Pancasila tenets contradict what is taught in Islam (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023).

Pancasila provides a strong ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundation for morality and public affairs, according to Yudian. Every concept has a historical foundation, rationale, and actuality; if comprehended, accepted, and continuously used, they can underpin outstanding accomplishments in the life of the country. Islamic teachings' notion of balance, known as Pancasila, combines the "pious" (hablumminallah) and "human" (wad'iy) (hablumminannas) (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023).

Implications of Yudian's Thought on the *Khilafah* Discourse in Indonesia

In 2003, he presented Yudian's concept of the caliphate within the framework of the New Order and Reformation, which emphasized comprehending, fortifying, and enforcing Pancasila. Yudian has a populist epistemology when it comes to Pancasila and the caliphate. The reason for this state of affairs was Yudian's deliberate counter-narrative against the caliphate concept that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) was fighting for (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023). Most HTI activists think that Indonesia is a good place for the establishment of a caliphate (Syah & Setia, 2021). Fulfills the requirements to establish a caliphate because it has the capacity for political independence from domination by other countries and national resilience to protect Muslims (Arif, 2016). After formally presenting HTI's perspective on Indonesia's potential as a caliphate state to the government in 2005, the National Ulama Conference was held in Jakarta on July 21, 2009. According to HTI, Pancasila is an ideology of unbelief that needs to be opposed for two reasons: it permits religious plurality and it permits non-Islamic ideologies like nationalism, socialism, and democracy (Azmy, 2020). Islam is the most appropriate religion for HTI since it is linked to the phrase "save Indonesia with Sharia" (Qohar & Hakiki, 2017).

Yudian uses maqashid al-syariah as an analytical method to disprove HTI's idea of a caliphate. Following the reformers' lead in providing national justifications for Pancasila, Yudian enhanced the picture

with a theological-epistemological viewpoint. The idea that Pancasila is the foundation of the state and ideology of a religious and Islamic nation is the common thread running through this argument.

Yudian said that the phrase "kalimatun sawa" or "ijma" encapsulates the case for the coexistence of Islam and Pancasila. This indicates that this idea is a purposeful political manifesto based on the Koranic teachings. It is also seen as an understanding and consensus agreement (ijma) that unites all citizens, Muslims included (Sadari, 2018). By carrying out the concept of maqashid sharia, Yudian states that Pancasila emphasizes religious tolerance to realize Indonesian unity (Rouf, 2022). Thus, when Indonesia was proclaimed as "Darul ahdi wa al-syahadat" (land of promise and witness) by Muhammadiyah and as "Darul mitsaq" (land of promise) by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Yudian stressed that Indonesia is a "country of consensus." Pancasila, the foundation of the state, requires more than just defense and guardianship as a shared country. The country must also cherish and uphold the integrity of all of its citizens as well as its sovereignty and unity. Yudian even brought up the symbolic significance of the 34 times one must prostrate (kiss the motherland) during prayer, day and night, for Muslims. One interpretation, according to Yudian, is that every Muslim should internalize a sense of patriotism. Yudian went on to say that devotion to one's nation (ijma) and faith (tauhid) are reflections of one's love for it (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023).

The integration of Allah's verses in three domains— theological (al-Quran and hadith), cosmic (natural law), and cosmic (humanitarian law)—is known as tauhid. Pancasila likewise has these three verses. The doctrine of belief in a one, all-powerful god is a theological verse since it upholds monotheism. Cosmological verses impart lessons about social fairness and humanity, as well as about nationalism and democracy. By incorporating "nature-humanity verses" into theology, Pancasila's practice amounts to monotheism (Wahyudi, 2015). The essence of Pancasila also suggests the essence of Sharia, necessitating the establishment of fair laws by Yudian. Islamic law is worldwide, local, absolute, relative, eternal, and temporal, according to Yudian. It is also humanitarian (insaniyah) and pious (ilahiyyah). Because it upholds human rights including the freedom of religion, life, thought, and dignity, Pancasila is a local version of this law, just as the Javanese mosque (meru) differs from the Arab mosque (dome) and is justified by sharia (Wahyudi, 2007).

Yudian went so far as to remove seven phrases from the Jakarta Charter, leaving just the Almighty Godhead, in recognition of Bung Hatta's ijtihad. It complies with some tenets of Islamic law (qawaid fiqhiyyah). The first is the maxim "Rejecting losses takes precedence over taking benefits." The threat of Eastern Indonesia's secession had to take precedence over the advantages of ratifying the objective of establishing an Islamic state at the time the "seven words" of the Jakarta Charter were signed. Secondly, "whatever cannot be achieved, does not need to be achieved is abandoned." To maintain the unity of an autonomous Indonesian territory, non-Muslims must accept the creation of an Islamic state from Sabang to Merauke, including the abolition of the seven words (Lahaji & Faisal, 2023). According to Yudian's epistemological perspective, the discussion of Islam and Pancasila came to an end when most Indonesian Muslims, including the two biggest mass organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU, accepted these ideas (Zamani & Hamidah, 2021). Regrettably, this has been the situation since the 1980s, and the New Order's collapse in 1998 caused its supporters to lose faith in Islamic interpretation. Thus, early on in the reform order's

development, the discourse of formalizing sharia and reinstating the Jakarta Charter emerged (Arif, 2020). It is harmful to create organized opposition to Islam and Pancasila and to curtail religious acts by their desires. Religion, not ethnicity, is Pancasila's greatest opponent. With this declaration, Yudian would like to remind you that this principle—which represents the greatest consensus of the Indonesian people—must be upheld to the greatest extent feasible. She also wants you to be cautious of religious organizations that, despite having radically different interpretations, frequently pose as the majority or minority, even though Pancasila and religion still oppose this (Asy'ari, 2015).

Through scholarly and cultural methods, Yudian's structural viewpoints and love for Pancasila are socialized and communicated. As a student of Islam and a soldier, Yudian was able to successfully unite the state with the Islamic spirit. As a result, every attempt is made to impart or create Indonesian and Islamic wisdom. Before being named Head of BPIP, Yudian made a concerted effort to spread this ideology. While holding the position of Chancellor at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yudian established the Center for the Study of Pancasila and National Defense. Presently, practically all establishments have constructed Pancasila Study Centers next to the House of Religious Moderation, particularly those connected to State Islamic Religious Universities. I've made good use of the time I spent as the agency's head promoting early notions of Islam and Pancasila. As an institution operating at the ministry level, BPIP possesses sufficient plans, agendas, manpower, and funding to promote socialization and teach the next generation about the need to preserve peace and unity in the country. Goal direction and achievement are often influenced by Yudian's position.

Islamic Fundamentalism According to Hassan Hanafi

Fundamentalism can be interpreted as statism vis a vis reform, inheritance vis a vis change, and progress in madzhab vis a vis a non-sectarian attitude. In short, fundamentalism is the opposite of secularism (Garaudy, 1993). In the Islamic context, according to Hasan Hanafi, the term fundamentalist refers to the Islamic revival movement, Islamic revivalism, and contemporary Islamic movements/groups (Hanafi, 2003). Personally, Hasan Hanafi is not phobic about the term Islamic fundamentalism, in fact in his autobiography, he closes with the following expression: "I am a child of Islamic fundamentalism, the objective history is also the history of my life" (Hanafi, 2003).

Judging from the development of Arab intellectual thought, Islamic fundamentalism has been the dominant discourse since the modern era and post-defeatism from 1967 AD until the 2000s. The word nihilism comes from the Arabic "dif'ah" which means defeat or destruction and is a term used to describe the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War against Israel in 1967 (Yoyo, 2012). Diftism has had a major impact on the Arab-Islamic world, both politically, socially, and intellectually. Diphthism ended the ideology of Arab nationalism and encouraged the emergence of various self-criticism and reform movements in Islamic thought. Diphthism also creates an identity crisis for Arab-Islamic peoples, who have to choose between adopting Western values or exploring Islamic values (Yahya, 2022; Yoyo, 2012).

In this perspective, Hasan Hanafi's dream of reconstructing Islam as a way to liberate oppressed people from Western and Zionist influence was influenced by the social, cultural, and political context in Cairo during his teenage years. In addition, his education in the West has influenced his thinking, which tends to be secular and free (Chotimah & Masudi, 2015). In other words, the reality of Egypt

and the orientation of Hasan Hanafi's thinking as well as his admiration and criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood movement are the foundations of his thinking about Islamic fundamentalism. (Munandar, 2007).

To understand Islamic fundamentalism, Hasan Hanafi starts from a basic understanding of the term fundamentalist. According to him, fundamentalism is the search for "foundation" or "legality" in religion. Because every government, country, and reality is based on a concept or thought. An Islamic state must be based on ash-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah, if a capitalist state is based on liberalism and a socialist state is based on the idea of "social justice". This shows that Islamic fundamentalism tries to formulate this legality, then implement it, and build an Islamic system and maintain it without considering the advantages and achievements of other existing systems. Islamic fundamentalism relies on bahts syar'i (search for the legality of shari'a), not analysis of reality. It also stands on axioms (fikrah mabda'iyyah) rather than real needs and uses a deductive methodology (istimbath) based on the interpretation of texts rather than an inductive methodology (istiqra'i) which requires the collection and classification of real data.

In this case, Hassan Hanafi does not agree with Islamic fundamentalism as conceptualized by the West. For him, Islamic fundamentalism does not have to be synonymous with being conservative, backward, and opposing modern civilization. Nor is it interpreted narrowly as an attitude of fanaticism, narrow-mindedness, rejection of dialogue, and self-reclusion (exclusion). This is proven by the many representatives of Islamic fundamentalism who are renowned as liberal thinkers, rationalists, broad-minded, master the history of world nations, accept the challenges of the times, and are open to modern civilizations.

Hasan Hanafi also disagrees with the idea that Islamic fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon that emerged as a result of the wave of modernity, as the West says. He argues that Islamic fundamentalism did not emerge from the present, but has existed throughout Islamic history. Islamic fundamentalism has a history and roots of thought that have existed since the beginning of Islam, starting from Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal, Ibn Taimiyah, and his student Ibn al-Qayim al-Jauziah, and has continued to exist until the modern Islamic movement.

Hasan Hanafi believes that Islamic fundamentalism does not mean a call to establish an Islamic state. Islamic fundamentalism is also not orthodoxy, romanticism of history, or an a priori attitude towards modernity because there is no place for anarchism in Islamic fundamentalism. According to Hasan Hanafi, Islamic fundamentalism was not born as a reflection of modern life as promoted by the West. On the contrary, he believes that fundamentalism has existed throughout Islamic history and has its own historical, sociological, psychological, and thought background (Hanafi, 2003).

Furthermore, Hasan Hanafi stated that violence in the name of religion can be caused by an imbalance between religious enthusiasm and the ability to understand religious teachings. Fanatical attitudes, narrow religious attitudes, and fundamentalism can arise from high religious enthusiasm but are not balanced with the ability to understand religious teachings (Hanafi, 2007). This is because according to Hasan Hanafi, in mystical societies, scientific ideology is almost certainly impossible. After all, tribal ritualism, which Hasan Hanafi calls fundamentalism, is trapped in ritualism without meaning and social, economic, and political elements. Both have the same weakness, namely that they deviate from the general

perspective of human history. Therefore, to create a paradigm for the liberation movement, Hasan Hanafi wants to build an epistemology that strengthens people's understanding or knowledge about the richness of Islamic traditions and provides social analysis from a Marxist perspective (Alfian, 2019).

In this context, one of the methods taken by Hasan Hanafi is to present constructive criticism of the problem of Islamic fundamentalism, which he considers to be the only ideology remaining after attempts at secular ideologies failed. As a liberal-leaning intellectual, Hasan Hanafi calls for a re-interpretation of Islamic law and criticizes Islamic fundamentalism. This is not intended to undermine this ideology but invites the reinterpretation of Islamic doctrine which is understood in a theocentric way (God as the center) to become anthropocentric (humans as the center). Thus, the left fundamentalism (yasar al-ushaliyyah) offered by Hanafi is not only a criticism but also a solution to the stagnation that occurs in conservative Islamic fundamentalist thought (Yoyo & Putra, 2014).

Thus, as an intelligent thinker, Hasan Hanafi did not just stop by defending Islamic fundamentalism; he then developed his ideas into more methodical and paradigmatic concepts, such as the Islamic Left concept and the at-Turats wa Tajdid project, which means tradition and modernization. These two concepts are manifestations of his thinking and defense against Islamic fundamentalism (Munandar, 2007). For Hasan Hanafi, Islamic fundamentalism represents a socio-political thought orientation approach to Islam. With his socio-political orientation, Hasan Hanafi emphasizes the synthesis aspect of classical traditions, Western ideas, and the contemporary reality of the Arab world where these two traditions interact (Hanafi, 2003).

Discussion and Analysis

This research indicates that Yudian offered a means of achieving a harmonious blend of Islam with Indonesian identity without imposing any negative psychological or theological effects. Reviving the caliphate would imply rejecting religion's open, inclusive, and global nature. This runs counter to the essence of monotheism, which demands Muslims to give up all nonreligious ideas. The unity of the divine. The idea of the caliphate is merely historical; it has nothing to do with the Muslim faith and doesn't need to be revered. However, when applying it to Indonesia, one must consider its sociocultural conditions, which are primarily marked by pluralism, growth, and development. Additionally, they believe that jihad may be carried out, the people can be united (pan-Islamism), and sharia can be put into effect. To put it succinctly, the caliphate can solve all issues related to corruption, crime, poverty, moral degradation, and the establishment of an Islamic administration. Nevertheless, objectively speaking, the idea of the caliphate is not as simple as "turning the palm of your hand" (Shofan, 2019).

Yudian wants to remind the next generation to develop historical consciousness to understand Islam in its context. The concept of "al-hukmu yaduru ma'a 'illah wujudan wa 'adaman" is exemplified by Yudian in the context of Sikh mansukh and fiqhiyah. In his view, improved instruction can take the place of any legislative requirements, depending on the circumstances. It is beneficial for Indonesia to have a diverse population in terms of religion, ethnicity, culture, and language, and this diversity shouldn't be ignored. Quite the reverse—these factors must also be considered. Should the concept of a caliphate be implemented in Indonesia, this is not a viable solution and could lead to discord among constituents. Furthermore, historical accounts demonstrate that every Muslim

considers the caliphate the center of the battle, and its existence is typically downplayed (Bolland, 2014).

Instead of an Islamic state, Yudian advocated for the necessity of a state founded on Islam. Islam-based nations share a common national consensus of giving and accepting one another without regard to ideologies. Indonesia has been dubbed by Yudian as the world's finest tiny paradise, with the state palace serving as its primary hub. The fight to teach Islam will become progressively more challenging as the state grows more remote from the religion. The Muslim community has to be robust, and Islamic politics ought to be regulated and colored rather than partisan and marginal. Unlike some radical Muslim activists, Yudian claims that the Prophet never supported the Islamic cause while incarcerated. Even more strategically, Islam could be fought for from the palace.

In addition to these elements, Yudian ideas regarding Pancasila, the Caliphate, and Islam have promoted a difficult indigenization process that led to the acculturation of this faith. This is a methodical and inventive approach to expanding the boundaries of Islamic comprehension. Sometimes, a partial or fragmented comprehension of this way of thinking elicits intense responses. But for Islam to become a part of an inclusive Islamic civilization, this way of thinking allows for the creative actualization of Islam in the nation through de-sacralization and objectification.

Meanwhile, Hasan Hanafi's thoughts on Islamic fundamentalism seem closer to rationalist fundamentalism (the term used by Ernest) because it rejects absolutism and is at the same time based on religious tradition and reason. Unlike Islamic fundamentalism in the narrow sense and synonymous with fanaticism, narrow-minded, exclusive, and anti-dialogical, Hasan Hanafi's version of Islamic fundamentalism is a discourse projection to achieve perfect personal formation through various approaches. He built a discourse on Islamic fundamentalism intending to revive Islam with a holistic study. So, Hasan Hanafi's Islamic fundamentalist thinking is very different from the way the West and most Muslims have reduced the meaning of Islamic fundamentalism to a narrow and sensitive one and includes every movement that fights the West by using violence in the name of Islam. (Munandar, 2007), where the main focus of the movement is to return to the original teachings of Islam (the Koran and Hadith). As a result, the issues of Islamic Sharia and the Islamic Khilafah always become the banners of their movement and reject all modern state concepts such as democracy, civil society, and human rights (Jamil, 2005).

According to Hasan Hanafi, Islamic fundamentalism is not only ritual militancy and external performance, growing beards, wearing hijab, demanding the application of Islamic law, establishing an Islamic state (Khilafah), and building mosques. Islamic fundamentalism itself led to many independence movements against colonialism in Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Palestine, and other Muslim-populated countries (Hanafi, 2003). Moreover, the Prophet never provided clear leadership standards for the next generation by setting boundaries regarding the appropriate type of leadership and its application. The Ijtihad of the Companions (Words of the Prophet *antum a'lam bi umûr dunyâkum*) which considers that leadership after the Prophet should not be empty, led to the emergence of the caliphate and the mention of "caliphate". This was also based on deliberations at Tsaqibah Bani Sa'idah which did not involve all important companion components, nor was it planned carefully, and did not have a strong theological basis (Chalik, 2014).

Islamic fundamentalism is also not orthodoxy, romanticism of

history, or an a priori attitude towards modernity because there is no place for anarchism in Islamic fundamentalism. Hasan Hanafi believes that fundamentalism has existed throughout Islamic history and has its own historical, sociological, psychological, and thought background. It was not born as a reflection of modern life as advertised by the West (Hanafi, 2003). Responding to this trend, it is worth paying attention to the conclusion made by Nunu Burhanuddin that Islamic fundamentalism which is associated with radical groups, is only a small variant because it displays radical traits and attitudes. For him, this can still be accommodated as national wealth by negating parasitic movements within it. So, fundamentalism yes, radicalism no (Burhanuddin, 2016).

This research demonstrates that the concept of the caliphate is vague and unsupported by current social and political circumstances. If it was prevalent in Arab nations in the past, several factors likely helped to foster it. Fighting for Arabization rather than Islamization might be understood as the imposition of a caliphate on Indonesia. The debate over the Indonesian caliphate, which has never been imposed literally, can be put to rest by pointing out that there are no sharia texts in the Koran or hadith. Yudian asked all residents to have confidence in constructing the nation's future because of Pancasila. Pancasila has been acknowledged as the ultimate notion, hence there is no longer any need to pursue the idealistic goal of discovering a different type of state philosophy. These two individuals underlined that it is impossible for competing or other ideas to emerge, particularly those that are associated with Islam.

The conversation above shows that the two leaders' denial of the caliphate narrative was based on both epistemological awareness and historical-sociological comprehension. Irrespective of their cultural background, ideas on the caliphate among Islamic scholars usually stem from a range of methodological and inspirational sources when it comes to understanding Islam in terms of human values. The intellectual paradigm makes it evident that Hasan Hanafi's struggle to "read" Islam in light of contemporary society had a significant influence on the Yudian vision of the caliphate. When people read Yudian's beliefs about Islam and the caliphate, they may thus perceive the open dynamics of Islamic philosophy. Furthermore, this concept may contradict the views of individuals who identify as Abduh's only adherents and champion his spirit, which is typically antagonistic to the West.

The author claims that Hasan Hanafi's mujtahids, or reformers, can benefit from Yudian's progressive analysis of Islam based on upcoming historical problems. More options for Muslims to participate in history and escape the confines of the past were made possible by these two individuals (particularly their captivity in the past's illusion). Because they have freed the past from religious tradition by the strength of their creation, these people serve as prophets because they possess a creative intellectual superiority in interpreting future history. As a result, this study makes use of Yudian's deliberate and ongoing lobbying, socialization, and education efforts to foster a peaceful, tolerant, just, and civilized environment for state and national life in Indonesia.

Yudian's idea is more practical and intellectual than Hasan Hanafi's, and it can help dispel misunderstandings regarding the nature of the Indonesian caliphate. Yudian claims that misperceptions regarding the caliphate necessitate the implementation of an action plan that must be carried out on two levels: preventing the dissemination of misinformation and providing ongoing education. Muslims are currently unprotected from political debate about the caliphate and other provocations. As a result, individuals might encounter false

information and interpretations. Rules about education must be put into effect right now. Likewise, forums for discussion and continuing support should be made available to groups exposed to incorrect viewpoints. It is necessary to promote public education as a counter-discourse to news production and false perceptions of the caliphate.

Conclusion

The Ottoman Caliphate's fall in 1922 marked the end of the Islamic Caliphate, which is understood to have been an imperial state. The idea of a caliphate as a means of regaining governmental authority became obsolete in light of later events. Historical evidence indicates that Arab society, situated closer to the Islamic civilization's heart, favored the establishment of a kingdom over a caliphate. Therefore, in the present circumstances, the rhetoric that aims to bring all Muslims together under the caliphate banner is merely a fiction.

According to Yudian, a person who masters the science of asthama and wins a competition is a caliph, and this should be understood as a sign of professional progress and ability. Al-Asma' (name) is a title used in science, technology, and the workplace. Yudian employs ushul fiqh or maqashid sharia in analyzing this discourse. According to these perspectives, the fight for the caliphate in this nation is fictitious, deceptive, hypocritical, unhistorical, and unsupported by sharia texts. Therefore, in addition to being fruitless and exhausting, attempts to further develop this discourse as a sacred thought harm the teachings of Islam that are good for the world and the principles of monotheism (rahmatan li al-'alamin).

In Hasan Hanafi's perspective, Islamic fundamentalism is not a call to establish an Islamic state. The discourse of orthodoxy, the romanticism of history, or an a priori attitude towards modernity, anarchism in the name of religion is a form of imbalance between religious enthusiasm and the ability to understand religious teachings. Fundamentalism that is trapped in ritualism without meaning and social, economic, and political elements is a weakness that deviates from the general perspective of human history. Therefore, an epistemology is needed that strengthens people's understanding or knowledge about the richness of Islamic traditions and provides social analysis to maintain civilization.

From the analysis of the thoughts of these two figures, they have the same goal of maintaining the universal values of Islam as rahmatan lil'alam. Yudian's perspective regarding the irrelevance of the discourse on caliphate power at this time, especially in Indonesia from the perspective of maqashid sharia, is relevant to Hasan Hanafi's Islamic fundamentalism through his theory of liberation. Yudian's encouragement to reformulate the meaning of the caliphate to increase the competence of the people is in line with Hasan Hanafi's thinking in efforts to strengthen society to show the greatness of *shalihun li kulli masa wa makan* Islamic civilization. Wallahua'lam bishshawab.

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